Abstract-The certificate-based encryption (CBE) is a new PKC paradigm which combines traditional public-key encryption (PKE) and identity based encryption (IBE) while preserving their features. CBE provides an efficient implicit certificate mechanism to eliminate third-party queries for the certificate status and to simply the certificate revocation problem. Therefore, CBE can be used to construct an efficient PKI requiring fewer infrastructures. In addition, it also solves the key escrow problem and key distribution problem inherent in IBE. In this paper, we construct an efficient CBE scheme with paring and prove it to be CCAsecure in the random oracle model based on the hardness of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion assumption. When compared with other existing CBE schemes, our scheme has obvious advantage in the computation performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry [1] introduced the notion of certificate-based encryption (CBE), which combines identity-based encryption (IBE) and traditional PKIsupported public key encryption (PKE) while preserving their features. CBE provides an implicit certification mechanism for a traditional PKI and allows a periodical update of certificate status. As traditional PKIs, each user in CBE generates his own public/private key pair and requests a long-lived certificate from the CA. This longlived certificate has all the functionalities of a traditional PKI certificate. But, CA generates the long-lived certificate as well as short-lived certificates (i.e., certificate status). A short-lived certificate can be pushed only to the owner of the public/private key pair and acts as a partial decryption key. This additional functionality provides an implicit certification so that the sender is not required to obtain fresh information on certificate status and the recipient can only decrypt the ciphertext using his private key along with an up-to-date short-lived certificate from its CA. The feature of implicit certification allows us to eliminate third-party queries for the certificate status and simply the public key revocation problem so that CBE does not need infrastructures like CRL [29] and OCSP [30] . Therefore, CBE can be used to construct an efficient PKI [21] requiring fewer infrastructures than previous proposals [32] [33] [34] [35] . Furthermore, there is no key escrow problem (since the CA does not know the private keys of users) and key distribution problem (since the certificates need not be kept secret) in CBE.
Since the introduction of CBE in [1] , in which Gentry proposed the first concrete CBE scheme based on the BF-IBE scheme [23] and proved its security in the random oracle model [18, 19] , there are different variants or improvements proposed in the literature later on. Yum and Lee [4] provided a formal equivalence theorem among IBE, certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) [2] and CBE. They showed that IBE implies both CBE and CL-PKE by giving a generic construction from IBE to those primitives. They [5] also proposed a method to generically construct of CL-PKE from IBE and PKE, which can also be adapted to generically construct CBE. However, Galindo et al. [6] pointed out that a dishonest authority could break the security of the three generic constructions given in [4, 5] . These constructions were inherently flawed due to a naive use of double encryption without further treatments. We solved this problem by providing two security-enhancing conversions in [9] and achieving two generic CBE constructions from PKE and IBE in [10, 11] , which are provably CCA-secure in the random oracle model. Al-Riyami and Paterson [3] gave an analysis of Gentry's CBE concept and repaired a number of problems with the original definition and security model for CBE. They also presented a generic conversion of CBE from CL-PKE and claimed that a secure CBE scheme could be constructed from any secure CL-PKE scheme using this conversion. Kang and Park [12] pointed out that their conversion was incorrect due to the flaw in their security proof. In [14] , Dodis and Katz gave generic techniques to build CCA-secure multipleencryption schemes from PKE schemes which are individually CCA-secure. They showed that their method could be applied to an IBE and a PKE (instead of two PKEs) and to build CBE schemes without resorting to the random oracle model. Recently, Wang et al. [15] proposed a certificate-based proxy cryptosystem based on Gentry's CBE scheme. Moreover, Morillo and Ràfols [8] proposed the first construction of CBE scheme secure in the standard model. Galindo et al. [7] proposed an improved CBE scheme based on the CBE scheme in [8] . In parallel to CBE, Kang et al. [13] proposed the security notion of certificate-based signature (CBS) that follows the idea of Gentry's CBE scheme and provided a concrete CBS scheme in the random oracle model. However, Li et al. [16] pointed out that this signature scheme was insecure against the key replacement attack. They refined the security model of CBS given in [13] and constructed a new CBS scheme which is secure in the random oracle model. Moreover, Au et al. [17] propose a new notion called certificate-based ring signature, which is the ring signature in certificate based cryptography setting.
In this paper, we propose a new efficient CBE scheme with pairing by combining the SK-IBE scheme [20, 21] with a traditional ElGamal-like cryptosystem [22] , and prove it to be CCA-secure in the random oracle model. Due to the advantage of SK-IBE in the computation performance, our CBE scheme requires computing no parings in the encryption algorithm and computing only one pairing in the encryption algorithm. When compared with other existing CBE schemes [1, 7, 8] , our scheme has obvious advantage in the computation performance.
II. BACKGROUND DEFINITIONS
Throughout the paper, G 1 and G 2 denote two additive cyclic groups of prime order q and G T a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order. P 1 denotes a generator of G 1 and P 2 denotes a generator of G 2 . is an isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 with (P 2 ) = P 1 . Note that from [25] , we can either assume that is efficiently computable or make our security proof relative to some oracle which computes . For us, a bilinear paring is a map e: G 1 G 2 G T with following properties: Bilinear: For all P G 1 , all Q G 2 and all a, b Z we have e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q) ab . Non-degenerate: e(P 1 , P 2 ) 1 .
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Computable: For all P G 1 and Q G 2 , e(P, Q) can be efficiently computed.
A bilinear paring satisfying the three properties above is said to be an admissible bilinear map. Typically, the map e can be derived from either the Weil or Tate paring on an elliptic curve over a finite field.
The security of the CBE scheme in this paper is proved based on the difficulty of the following problem which is introduced in [21, 24] .
p-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Inversion (p-BDHI) Assumption: For an integer p and a random element * q x Z , , 
III. CERTIFICATE-BASED ENCRYPTION
In this section, we briefly review the definition and security model for CBE. These definitions are taken from [3, 12] , where the original definitions given in [1] were reconsidered. Definition 1. A certificate-based encryption (CBE) scheme is a tuple of five PPT algorithms (Setup, SetKeyPair, Certify, Enc, Dec) such that:
Setup is a probabilistic algorithm taking as input a security parameter k. It returns the certifier's master-key sk CA and public parameters params that include the descriptions of a finite message (plaintext) space MSPC, a finite ciphertext space CSPC, and two string spaces T and . We consider params to be an implicit input to the rest of the algorithms.
SetKeyPair is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a public/private key pair <pk, sk>.
Certify is a deterministic certification algorithm that takes as input <sk CA , T, id , pk>. It returns a shortlive certification Cert id, , which is sent to the user. Here is a string identifying a time period, while id contains other information needed to certify the user, and pk is the user's public key.
Enc is a probabilistic algorithm taking as inputs < , id, pk, M>. It returns a ciphertext C for message M.
Dec is a deterministic algorithm taking <Cert id, , sk, C> as input in time period . It returns either a message M or the special symbol indicating a decryption failure.
Naturally, it is required that these algorithms must satisfy the standard consistency constraint, that is for all M MSPC, Dec(Cert id, , sk, C)=M where C=Enc( , id, pk, M; ), Cert id, = Certify(sk CA , , id, pk) and <pk, sk> is a valid public/private key pair.
The adaptive chosen-ciphertext security for CBE is defined against two different types of adversaries. The Type I adversary 1 has no access to the master-key and models an uncertified user. The Type II adversary 2 models an honest-but-curious certifier who possesses the master-key sk CA attacking a fixed user's public key. Phase 2. As in phase 1, with the restriction that < ch , id ch , C * > is not the subject of a decryption query.
Guess. 2 Similarly, we can define the weak security notion IND-CBE-CPA for CBE schemes, in which the adversaries are disallowed to issue any decryption queries.
IV. AN EFFICIENT CBE SCHEME
In this section, we first build a basic CBE scheme called BasicCBE which is IND-CBE-CPA secure. Then we extend BasicCBE to an IND-CBE-CCA secure CBE scheme called FullCBE by using a security enhancing transformation introduced in [11] .
A. BasicCBE
The scheme BasicCBE is consisted of the following five polynomial time algorithms: Setup: Given a security parameter k Z + , the parameter generator takes the following steps:
1 
In the above construction, the certificates are short signatures computed using a signature scheme considered in [28] . As proven in Theorem 3 of [28] , this signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosenmessage attack [27] in the random oracle model, provided that the k-sCCA1 assumption is sound in G 2 .
The consistency of the construction is easy to check as we have
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B. FullCBE
The scheme FullCBE is consisted of the following five polynomial time algorithms:
Setup: As in the BasicCBE. In addition, we select two hash functions 
V. SECURITY PROOF
To prove the security of FullCBE, we define the following two public key encryption schemes called BasicPub-I and BasicPub-II.
The public key encryption scheme BasicPub-I is specified by following three algorithms:
Keygen: Given a security parameter k Z + , the parameter generator takes the following steps:
1. Generate the parameters {q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , , e, n, P 1 , P 2 , g} which are identical to the ones of NewBasicCBE.
2. Pick a random 
The public key encryption scheme BasicPub-II is specified by following three algorithms:
1. Generate the parameters {q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , , e, n, P 1 , and responds with the ciphertext C ch . Then forwards C ch to 1 .
Phase 2:
As in phase 1, with the restriction that < ch , id ch , PK ch , SK ch > is not the subject of a certification query.
Guess: Finally, 1 outputs its guess b' for b, outputs the same b' as its own guess.
Obviously, if does not abort during the simulation then 1 's view is identical to its view in the real attack.
As shown above, could abort when one of the following events happens: (1 
Reformulate f(z) to get 
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we will make a computation performance comparison of the scheme FullCBE and other existing CBE schemes [1, 7, 8] . Here, we consider four major operations in all the CBE schemes, i.e., pairing (p), multi-exponentiation (m), exponentiation (e) and hash (h). Among these operations, the pairing operation is considered as the heaviest time-consuming one in spite of the recent advances in the implementation technique [26] . The ciphertext size is expressed by the length n for the plaintext, the length k 0 for the random string used in the encryption algorithm, and the length l for an element in G 1 ( or G 2 ), while com and tag refer to the size of the commitment string for the commitment scheme and the message authentication code used in the scheme proposed by Morillo and Ràfols [8] , vk and s refer to the size of the verification key and the signature for the one-time signature scheme used in the scheme presented by Galindo, Morillo and Ràfols [7] .
Considering the pre-computation, the detailed computation performance of all the CBE schemes is listed in Table I . We can see that our CBE scheme has better computation performance than other CBE schemes, especially in the encryption algorithm. Although, Scheme 2 and Scheme 3 do not require computing any pairings in the encryption algorithm too, they require additional building blocks to guarantee the security of the resulting schemes. Compared to Scheme 1, our scheme requires one more multiplication operation and exponentiation operation in the encryption algorithm. However, our scheme is still more efficient because two pairing operations in the encryption algorithm of Scheme 1 are much more time-consuming. Moreover, Scheme 1 and Scheme 3 both require the maptopoint operation [23] to map a string to an element in G 1 (or G 2 ) which is inefficient and slower than the general hash function used in our scheme which maps a string to an element in * q Z . 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an efficient pairing-based CBE scheme and prove it to be secure in the sense of IND-CBE-CCA in the random oracle model based on the hardness of the p-BDHI problem. Regarding the computation performance, our scheme does not require computing any pairings in the encryption algorithm and need to compute only one pairing in the decryption algorithm. When compared with other existing CBE schemes, our scheme has obvious advantage in the computation performance.
